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[So F. Ro. 20649.

In Bank.

June 4, 1962.]

FOOTHILL JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICT OF SANTA
CLARA COUNTY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY
et al., Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Universities and Colleges-Taxation-Disposition of Surplus.
-A newly organized junior college district, comprising about
44 per cent of the area of the county formerly not within any
junior college district on which the board of supervisors levied
a tax to pay tuition to junior college districts attended by
children residing in the county in a nonjunior college area,
was entitled to a proportionate share (44.43 per cent) of
the surplus of such tax collected during the district's first
year and applied on tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior
college district of which the new junior colle:;e district had
formerly been It part, since the tax was not a general ad
valorem tax impose d to meet gene ral obligations of local government, but was a specific t ax levied for a single purpose;
that single purpose having been satisfied, the taxpayers in the
new district would receive no benefit from the surplus con-

McK. Dig. References: [1] Universities and Colleges, § 5; [2]
Universities and Colle;;es, § 10.
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tributed by them unless that surplus was returned to the
district.
[2] Id.-Actions-Parties.-A junior college district is Il. proper
party plaintiff, as trustee of the school district funds, to
assert its right to a proportionate share of the surplus of the
tuition tax collected during the district's first year as an entity
and applied on tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior
college district of which the junior college district had formerly been a part.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. Ross A. Carkeet, Judge.- Reversed with directions.
Action by a junior college district for declaratory relief
with respect to surplus tax funds collected by county within
district during its first year as an entity and applied on
tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior college district of
which the junior college district had formerly been a part.
Summary judgment for defendants reversed with directions.
Richard H. Perry for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Spencer M. Williams, County Counsel, and Selby Brown,
Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.
DOOLING, J .-This appeal presents the question of the
rights of the parties with respect to surplus tax funds collected
in plaintiff district by defendants to pay tuition to certain
other junior college districts.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Pursuant to an election,
plaintiff district was established on July 1, 1957. During the
school year July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1957, residents in plaintiff district sent their children to junior colleges outside of
the district area. Under the then law, the county in which the
nonjunior college district area was situated was required to
impose a special tax on the residents of that area to establish
a junior college tuition fund. (Ed. Code, §§ 7231, 7232; now
§§ 2020J., 20202.) This fund was then used to reimburse th e
junior college districts for the full tuition costs of the children
in attendance from the nonjunior college district areas. The
tax for the fund was imposed to pay for attendance during
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Universities and Colleges, § 78; Am.Jur.,
. Universities and Colleges, § 31 et seq.
• AlI8iped by Chairman of Judicial Couneil.
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the preceding year rather than for the current year, and in
theory it should yield the amount necessary to defray the
junior college tuition obligations without producing a surplus.
Plaintiff district represented approximately 44 per cent of
the nonjuuior college district area in Santa Clara County.
For the school year July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1958, residents
of plaintiff district paid two sets of taxes: one was to support
plaintiff, a new junior college district, during the first year
of its operation; the other was its share as formerly a part
of a nonjunior college district for tuition costs owing to junior
college districts for the preceding year. After such reimbursement was made for those districts, it was found that there was
a surplus of $35,793.23. According to past years' practice,
such surplus would be applied to the next year's tuition costs
so as to lower the tax rate for the entire nonjunior college
district area. Of the abo>e-stated surplus 44.43 per cent or
$15,902.93 was attributable to the area of plaintiff district.
Plaintiff now as a legal entity seeks a declaration of its right
to this sum. 1 The trial court ordered a denial of plaintiff's
motion for a judgment on the pleadings and granted a summary judgment to defendants.
The question arises in this way. The governing statute by its
express terms required the levy of a tax "upon all taxable
property in the county not situated in any junior college district" (Ed. Code, § 7232; Stats. 1955, p. 3369; emphasis added)
to reimburse other junior college districts for the children in
attendance in such districts from the nonjunior college areas
of the county during the preceding year. This statute, and its
predecessor statute considered in Pasadena Junior College
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Cal. 61 [13 P.2d 678], only
made provision for the levy of such tax on property" not situated in any junior college district" and thus by its terms
would exclude a tax on property in a newly formed junior
college district even though during the preceding year such
property was not in any junior college district, and but for
its incorporation into the newly formed district would be
liable for its proportion of such tax. In view of the obvious
unfairness of this result, we held in the Pasadena case that
in conformity' with the "spirit of our laws, which seek to
'While in its complaint plaintiff asked for affirmative relief in addition to a declaration of its rights, on this appeal plaintiff has abandoned
ita claim for other affirmative r elief and asks only for a declaratory
judgment. (Appellant'9 Reply Brief, p. 4.)

\
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impose upon all prop erty in the state its just proportion of
taxation," it ,rould be ineqaitable for the area "embraced
within the n ewly organized" district not to pay the obligations incurred during the preccding year for the education
of its junior coIIege studcnts in other districts (216 Cal., p.
72), and accordingly issued our writ of mandate in that case
to compel the levy of such tax ou the property within the
newly formed district.
Theoretically such tax should only be suffkicnt to raise the
exact amount needed to meet the specific obligation. PracticaIIy, of course, no such perfection can be expected of any
human operation subject to the uncertainties inherent in the
taxing process. The result has been a surplus in the tax funds
actually coIIected, which normally is carried forward to r educe
the amount ne eded to be raised for the same purpose in the
succeeding year. HO'wever, plaintiff district has no such obligation for th e succeeding year and if the C'xcess of $15,902.93
is used for that purpose, plaintiff's taxpayers will to that
extent be contributing to the payment of an obligation to
which they have no legal obligation to contribute. Since, as
we held in Pasadena, equity required its taxpayers to contribute to the satisfaction of a particular obligation and that
obligation has now been fully satisfied, plaintiff argues that
equity equally demands that the excess of its taxpayers' contribution to the fund for that purpose should now be used
for the benefit of the school district in which it was raised,
and not for the benefit of the taxpayers of the still nonjunior
collrge areas of the county for 'which plaintiff's taxpayers no
longer have allY lrgal responsibility.
[1] We are persuaded that under the p eculiar facts of
this case this argument is sound. Th e particular tax in question is not a general ad valorem tax imposed to meet the
general obligations of local gOyernlllent, "'here presumably
the community as a whole benefits from the governmental
services supported by the tax collected. ( P eople v. City of
Palm Springs, 51 Ca1.2d 38, 47-48 [331 P.2d 4].) Rather
it is a specific tax levied for a single purpose and that single
purpose having been fully satisfi ed, the taxpa~-ers in plaintiff
district :will clearly receive no benefit from the surplus contributed by them unless that surplus is returned to plaintiff
district. Application of the surplus to the benefit of the areas
in the county still not within a junior college district will
result ill plaintiff's taxpayers paying an obligation for which
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they have no legal liability and for which they can receive no
possible governmental service in return.
Defendants argue that the Legislaturc has provided specifically for the distribution of surplus school funds in oth er
situations but has made no pro\'ision in the case of any surplus
in the junior college tuition fund, which would. indicate that
no such transfer as plaintiff seeks was intended. Thus, when
a lapsed elementary school district is merged into another
district, its funds are transferred. (Ed. Code, § 1880.) Where
there is a school district fund surplus, 80 per ccnt of it may
be transferred to the county school service fund . (Ed. Code,
§ 20104.) Any "unnecessary surplus" in the county school
tuition fund may be transferred to the county school service
fund. (Ed. Codc, § 20162.) Thcre may be a transfer of funds
of a school district library to the county library if the former
becomes a branch. (Ed. Code, § 7202.)
But the special tax here rests on a different premise entirely. The county superintendent of schools computes the
total cost of ed.ucation from the preceding year for junior
college students living in nonjunior college areas. (Ed. Code,
§ 7231; now § 20201.) That is a fixed and certain amount
already established, and not, as in most estimates for tax
purposes, an approximation of future expenditures. From this
amount the county controller deducts the surplus that is
currently in the fund, and the remainder is the sum which must
be raised in the tax levy. He then determines the total assessed
value of all taxable property on the secured roll and reduces
this figure by 2 per cent as a delinquency factor. The result
of this computation is divided into the amount that must be
raised, and the quotient is the rate of tax to be lcvied. Under
this method the 2 per ccnt delinquency factor is doubtless a
reasonable estimate based upon experience, but as a mntter or
fact the amount raised is never precisely the amount needed.
and a residual will usually result. (Otis v. Los A.ng eles
County, 9 Cal.2d 366, 373 [70 P.2d 633] ; Am('l'ican Sec'urit ics
Co. v. Forward, 220 Cal. 566, 576-577 [32 P.2d 343, 96 A.L.n.
1268].) Yl't'the statute provides that the special tax is only
to be "snffieient in amount to d efray" the specified junior
college tuition co s ~s (Eel. Codr, § 7232; now § 20202) and in
the ab!>enre of any express method for its calculation, there
is nothing to indicate that the Legislature even contemplated
that there would be a surplus so as to be assigned any intent
as to its disposition. Normally, the surplus from one year

)

776

FOOTHILL JUNIOR COL Lr::GC DlST.
BOARD OF SUPERn.SOl~S

v.

[57 C.2d

would be deducted from the llext year ':; tax, aud the taxpayers
in the entire area as contilllliug r csitlents of a nonjunior
collegc district would receiyc th e prog ressive bellefits from
year to year. But this now is 110t the t:llse here since the taxpayers of plaintiff district 110 longer qualify for surplus
moneys retained for the education of j nllior college students
in areas not within a junior college district, alld allY "temporary inequalities arising from cumulative" levies would
never "be ironed out and equalized." (A.merican Securities
Co. v. Forward, supra, 220 Cal., p. 577.)
The questioll involved in this litigation is one which will
not recur. In 1959 section 20211 of the Education Code was
adopted. (Stats. 1959, p. 4761.) This section provides, in
effect, that the state shall bear a new junior college district's
obligation to other districts for the cost of educating its junior
collegc students in the preceding y ear instead of having, as
theretofore, the levy of such tuition tax as here was done.
By such enactment the Legislature has enunciated a policy
against the double taxation feature previously prevailing in
the first year of a newly formed jUllior college district's existence. While the statute applies prospectively, there appears
to be llO reason why its policy should not, as far as possible,
have some retrospective force.
Since plaintiff is only asking for a declaratory judgmellt,
we are not here concerned with any question of its possible
remedies to recover the sum involved in view of defendants'
assertion that the "fund" resulting from the surplus of
$15,902.93 here in issue has now been expended. Nor are we
concerned with hypothetical cases illYolving the annexation
of a portion of one school district to another and other such
situations suggested by defendants. "'\Ve limit our decision to
the peculiar facts of this case and hold simply that this
$15,902.93 which was raiscd by taxation for one specific purpose from the taxpayers of plaintiff district and proved not
to be needed for that specific purpose, in equity and good
conscience became the property of the junior college district
whose specific obligation it w·as raised to meet.
[2] In view of this conclusion plaintiff district is a proper
party plaintiff to assert this right as trustee of the school
district funds .. (Butler v. Compton JUllior College Dist., 77
Cal.App.2d 719, 729 [176 P.2d 417] ; Pomona City School
Dist. v. Payne, 9 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [50 P.2d 822] ; see also
Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177,181-182 [302 P.2d 574].)
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The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment
on the pleadings declaring plaintiff's rights in accordance with
this opinion.
Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J .-1 dissent.
Plaintiff does not seek relief on the basis of any right of
individual taxpayers to recover the surplus in question. They
have no such right. The tax was valid when levied (Rancho
Santa .Anita, Inc. v. City of .A1·cad1·a, 20 Cal.2d 319, 324-326
[125 P.2d 475]), and was not invalidated "hen some taxpayers receiycd less benefit from the use of the fumls raised
than other taxpayers. (A.naheim Sugar Co. v. County of
Omllge, 181 Cal. 212, 217 [183 P. 809] ; see 16 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations (3d eel.) § 44.47, pp. 127-128.)1 Thus,
by organizing a new junior college district (Ed. Code, §§ 25512570), owners of property therein could not make the tax
invalid or create a right to any of the proceeds thereof on the
ground that they will not get the benefits of the surplus that
other taxpayers of Santa Clara County will gct whose property is Dot within the Dew district.
Nor has plaintiff any legal right to the surplus. The tax
was levied by the COUDty for county purposes and when collected was county property. County property belongs to the
state, and the legal title is held by the county as trustee for
the benefit of its residents. (Coullty of Los Angeles v. Graves,
~10 Cal. 21, 25 [290 P. 444 ] .) Similarly, school district property belongs to the state, and the school district has the same
powers and respoDsiLilities ,,,ith respect to it that counties
have with respect to their property. (Hall v. City of Taft,
47 Cal.2d 177, 181-182 [302 P.2d 574] ; Pass School Dist. v.
Hollywood etc. DI:8t ., 156 Cal. 416, 418 [105 P. 122, 20 Ann.
Cas. 87, 26 L .R.A. N.S. 485].) The proceeds of this tax were
county property when they first came into the county treasury. At DO time has the junior college tuition fund or any
part thereof been changed from county property to junior'The 1957 tax levy raised $714,661.44, and the surplus carried o.er
from the 1956 tax was $31,445.71. After expenditures of $710,313.93
for the school year 19 ;3 6·1957, tile fund contained a surplus of $35,i93.~2.
Property owners in phintiff's territory therefore rceei.ed the same
benefits as other property owners in the county from 95.2 per cent of,
the fund . As to the remaining 4.8 per cent, those in plaintiff's territory
are no differently situated from others in tile county "ho deri.ed no
direct benefit from the junior college tuition fund or a part thereof.
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college-district property. The county is still trustee of this
fund, and plaintiff has no IC'gal claim thereto. What plaintiff
is seeking is a transfer of funds from the county as trustee
to it as trn.stee on the ground that a part of the surplus ,vas
acquired from property owners within its boundaries and
although such owncrs have no right to rccover the surplus they
should get it indirectly through the r eduction in their taxes
for the support of plaintiff that could result from its acquisition of part of the surplus.
Such transfers can be made if authorized by statute. Thus,
the holding in Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood Dist ., supra,
that when a new school district is carved out of an old one,
title to property located in the new district is transferreu
to it, was based on a statutory provision vesting in school
districts management and control of school property located
within their boundaries. (P. 418.) The court noted that "in
the absence of such provision, the rule of the common law
obtains, and that rule leaves the property where it is found .
... " (P. 419; Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414,417-418 [28 P.
1067].) This rule applies here, for there is no statutory provision for the transfer of these funds from the county to
plaintiff. Not only is there no provision for such a transfer,
but the statutes expressly direct the use to which the funds
are to be put and the manner in which they are to be administered. (Ed. Code, §§ 20204-20208.) The county has adhered
to these statutory directions, as it was obliged to do, and has
expended the surplus in question for the junior college education of its residents in the school yCa!· 1957-1958. Education
Code section 20201 specifies the educational expenses to be
paid from the junior college tuition fund, and section 20202
authorizes the board of supervisors to levy a tax" sufficient in
amount to defray all amounts specified in subdivisions (a),
(b), and (c) of section 20201." There is no authority for a
tax levy to pay this judgment or any other costs from the
junior college tuition fund that are not specified in section
20201 . •Payment of the judgment out of the county's general
fund, ,,·hich is raised by taxes levied on all property in the
county, would defeat the purpose of the judgment, for it
would require property owners in plaintiff's territory to pay
nearly half the judgment themselves even though it is intended for their benefit against other property owners in the
county_
Pasadena Junior Oollege Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 216
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Cal. 61 [13 P.2d 678], on which plaintiff relies, does not support its contention that it has an equitable right to rccover
the smplus indep cn dent of any statute on the ground that the
surplus was created by a tax levy not authorized by statute
but re!]uired only by equitable principles. That case involved
the construction of Education Code section 7232 (now
§ 20202) exempting from taxation for the junior college tuition fund property " situated in any junior college district. "
That phrase was held to r efer to the time at which the expenses
payable from the junior college tuition fund were incurred
rather than the time at which the tax therefor was levied. It
is true that the court chose the more equitable interpretation
of this language, but there can be no doubt that it was the
statutc and not equitable principles independent thereof that
compelled the result in that case.
The Legislature is aware of the problem of allocating surplus tax funds such as those in issue here. Education Code
sections 20151 through 20162, for example, provide for the
county school tuition fund to pay the expenses of California
students attending school in adjoining states. This fund, like
the junior college tuition fund, is created by a special ad
valorem tax levied in one year to pay the costs incurred in
the previous year. S ection 20162 directs the county superintendent of school;;, with the approval of the county auditor,
to "transfer any unneces3ary surplus in the county school
tuition fund to the county school service fund [see Ed. Code,
§§ 20101-20109] whenenr in his judgment the surplus will
not be needed for the payment of tuition. " There is no similar
provision for the transfer of a surplus in the junior college
tuition fund . Moreover, in 1959 the Legislature added section
20211 to the provisions of the Education Code relating to the
junior college tuition fund. That section eliminated the procedure under which owners of property in a new junior college
district "'ould be taxed twice during the first year of the
district's existence- once by the district and once by the
county for the prior year's expenses payable from the junior
college tuition fund. The Legislature did not provide, howevcr, for the apportionment of that fund or any surplus
therein between the counly and a new district. Inasmuch as
the contribution to be made by the state under this section
is to bc "the difference between the amoullt which would have
been raised [in the new district] in such year if a special tax

780

FOOTHILL .JUNIOR COLLEGE DIST. V.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

had been levied in such territory pursuant to Section 20202,
and the amount which actually was or will be raised in such
year from the levy of the special tax required by this paragraph," a surplus, attributable in part to the state, in part to
property owners in the new district (if the junior-collegetuition-fund tax rate exceeds that of the district), and in part
to other property owners in the county, is as likely to arise
in the future as in the past, for delinquencies can never be
estimated exactly.2 By providing for apportionment of any
such surplus the Legislature could have reduced substantially the state's contribution to the fund. It is significant
that, having made provision for disposition of like surpluses
in similar funds, and having had this problem before it in
1959, the Legislature did not provide for such apportionment.
"It is not our province to weigh the desirability of the social
or economic policy underlying the statute or to question its
wisdom; they are purely legislative matters." (Allied Properties v. D epartment of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Ca1.2d
141, 146 [346 P.2d 737].)
The judgment should be affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 27,
1962. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
'For example, assume that the county levies a junior-college-tuitionfund tax of one cent per $100 a.ssesscd property valuation, that the new
district levies a district tax of one-half cent per $100 assessed property
.aluation, that the total assessed mlue of all property in the county is
~100,000,000, and that half of it is in the new district. Under the old
procedure property owners in the new district would pay both taxes in
full, or a total of $7,500, $5,000 of which would be paid to the county
and $2,500 to the district. Other property owners in the county would
pay only the county tax, or a total of $5,000 to the county. Under the
new procedure property owners in the new district would pay a total
of $5,000 of which $2,500 would be paid to the county and $2,500 to
the district. The state would make up the difference between what they
paid to the county and what they would have paid to the county under
the old procedure, or $2,500. A surplus is as likely to arise from an
over-estimate of delinquencies under either procedure. If, for example,
the surplus were $1,000, under the new procedure $250 would be attributable to the state, ~250 to the property owners in the new district,
and $.300 to other property owners in the county. Under the majority
opinion the state as well as the new district would be entitled to $250 .
Had the Legislature intend ed any such disposition of the surplus it
would have so provided.

